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OCTOBER

TERM, 1967

No. 67
JOHN

w. TERRY
v.

STATE OF OHIO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TllE
BT.A.TE OF OHIO

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
INTEREST OF TEE tl'NI'I'ED STATES

Although there is no federal statute comparable to
the so-called "stop and frisk" laws adopted in many
States, the United States has a direct interest in the
definition of the power of law enforcement officers to
detain persons without formal arrest in the course
of investigating crime. Federal agents, although they
do not exercise the broad powers of local police, are
not infrequently confronted with situations where
effective law enforcement in the areas within their
jurisdiction would require them to stop and detain
persons for a limited period of time in order to obtain
and verify information. Also, of course, investigations by local police frequently produce evidence of
(1)
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federal crime. The question whether such evidence was
lawfully obtained in the first instance has obvious
consequence for federal law enforcement.
We are filing our brief in the Ter·r y case since its
context is not unlikethat which is apt to characterize
a typical federal case; that is to say, it concerns the
general powers of law enforcement officials and does
not turn on a specific statutory definition of police
authority. The fundamental question, as we view it, is
whether it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's
guaranty of the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons" against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" to recognize a right of law enforcement
officers to stop and detain a person for a limited
period for the purpose of investigation. We urge that
such a limited detention need not be regarded as an
arrest, and that therefore the basis for such detention

need not satisfy the standard of probable cause which
would have to be met in orcler to secure a warrant of
arrest. The Fourth Amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches is satisfied if the detention is
reasonable under the circumstances, which necessarily
must vary from situation to situation. This is not to
argue that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to
police conduct fairly described by the term, '' stop
and frisk"; rather, it is to say that a lesser showing
will meet the constitutional test of reasonableness in
the case of a brief detention on the street than in the
case of a conventional arrest. If a right of limited
detention does exist, w.e suggest further that a law enforcement officer has the right to pat clown the suspect's outer clothing in order to determine whether
439
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he possesses a weapon, assuming that this step appears reasonably necessary for the detaining Qfficer's
self-protection.
I.

THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS REASONABLEABLE
LIMITED DETENTION FOR INVESTIGATION

A. A DISTINCTION MAY VALIDLY DE DRAWN UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BETWEEN ARRESTS AND LIMITED DETENTIONS FOR

INVESTIGATION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
stitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation
and particularly describing the place to 'be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The heart of the problem is whether the limited
"seizure" of the person involved in a brief detention
by police for investigation is equivalent to the seizure
under a warrant for which the Fourth Amendment
requires probable cause. This is often phrased in terms
of whether such seizure should be deemed an arrest.
However mere reference to terminology does not resolve the issue. The term arrest-which does not
appear in the Fourth Amendment-has different
shades of n1eaning in differing contexts. As was said in
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.
N.Y.), reversed on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 2):
In dealing with words there is always a temptation
tion to allow them to beeome separated from
440
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their objective correlatives in the everyday
world, and to treat them as if they have, or
ought to have, one single simple meaning,_unaffected
a:ffected by the contexts in which they occur and
divorced from the world of things and events
which give them their content and justification.
"Arrest" is just such a word, not only because
it is necessarily unspecific and descriptive of
complex, often extended processes, but because
in different contexts it describes different processes, each of which has built up, in both legal
and common parlance, sharply divergent emotional connotations.
An arrest under a warrant of arrest involves more
than the mere stopping of a person on the street or in
a car, even when the stopping is by a police officer.
An arrest lmder a warrant is for the purpose of bringing the individual "before a court, body or official or
of otherwise securing the administration of the law."
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201
(1940) ; Hall, Law and Government, The Law of
Arrest, 1-4 (2d ed. 1961). In its criminal aspect, it
is the taking of a person into custody so that ha may
be available to answer for the commission of a crime.1
Similarly, an arrest without a warrant for a specific
crime is not only to restrain the individual, but to take
him into custody to answer criminal charges. For that
See 1 Varon, Searches, Seizures a.nd Immunities 59 (1961); 2
Blackstone's Commentaries 234 (1866 ed.); 1 Chitty's Criminal
La.'v 11 (5th ed. 1847) ; Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa
L. Rev. 201 (1940); Note, Detenticn, Arrest, and Salt Lake
CityPolice Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593, 598 (1965) ; LaFave,
Arrest 4 (1965); Tiffany, Mcintyre & Rotenberg, Detection of
Crime 9 (1967); Note, Philadelphia Police Practices and the
Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1186 (1952); American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts 2d § 112 (1965) .
1
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kind of arrest-with or without a warrant-there must
be probable cause.
A limited detention in the course of a police investigation does not contemplate the bringing of an individual into court to answer to specific charges. No
warrant of a court would therefore issue for such an
investigation. We submit that the Fourth Amendment's requirement that "no Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause" is not directed to this type of
Jetention_.the reason being that such detention is
not equivalent to a detention under a warrant. The
Fourth Amendment does apply, to be sure, insofar as
it guarantees the right of the people to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure of any kind. "The
use of the word 'unreasonable,' in this (Fourth)
Amendment," :Mr. Justice Black has observed, "'means,
of course, that not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Only those which are unreasonable are unlawful." Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
865, 873 (1960) (emphasis in original). See also the
comment of Mr. Justice Stewart in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U .S. 206, 222. In our view, both history
and the practicalities of current law enforcement support the conclusion that a police officer's power to detain, if carefully exercised in the light of the circumstances, is reasonable and thus consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
B. A LIMITED POWER OF

DETI:~'"TION

FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES

POSES IIAS HISTORICAL BASIS AND STRONG JUSTIFICATION IN THE
NEEDS OP OUR SOCIETY

At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted,
the particular evil which concerned the advocates of
442
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the Bill of Rights was the abuse represented by the
general warrant, only recently outlawed in England by
case law and statute. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 93· Eng.
Rep. 489 Common Pleas 1763); Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell's State Cases 1030 (K.B. 1765) ; Lasson,
'1 he History and Development of the Fourth A.1nenrlment 48-50 (1937). The Fourth Amendment does, of
course, go beyond that particular evil in protecting the
people from any unreasonable search and seizure.
I-Iowever, there is no indication that normal law enforcement techniques of the period were regarded as
within its prohibitions. We recognize that it is difficult
to draw a sharp analogy to conditions existing at the
ti1ne of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment; modern police departments arc a product of the 19th century. However, in England and in the Colonies, 2 there
1

For example, the right of "watchmen" to stop and detain
strangers at nighttime was established by statutein Massachusetts
setts as early as 1658 an continued into the 20th century. See
Massachusetts Colonial Laws 1660-1672 p. 198 (1889) . As reenacted
acted in 1797, "watchmen" were charged with t.he duty to
* * * see that all disturbances and disorders in the night
shall be prevented and suppressed; and to examine all persons
sons whom they shall see walking abroad in the nightafter
ten o'clock, and whom they have reason to suspect of any
unlawful intention or desig11, of the business abroad at such
season, and whither they arc going; and in the case they
give not reasonable satisfaction therein, then to secure, by
imprisonment or otherwjse, all such disorderly and suspicious
picious persons, to be safely kept until morning; then to
carry them before one of the next Justices of the Peace, to
be examined and proceeded against according to the nature
of their offenses as is by law provided.
~ Perpetual Laws of Massachusetts 1788-1799, Ch. 82, Sec. 2,
p. 410.
A similar system of watchmen prevailed in colonial New
York. See Costello, History of the New York Police (1885),
chapters 2-4.
443
2

7

was a system of watchmen dating back to the Norman
kings: The watchmen had a role akin to the peacekeeping functions of a police department.s
As pointed out in Warner, The Uniform, Arrest Act,
28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 319 (1942), such watchmen were
deemed to have the power to detain persons, at least
at night, until they could account for their presence.
'rhis power was recognized in Lawrence v. Hedger,
3 Taunt. 13 (Common Pleas 1810), involving an action for false imprisonment by an individual who had
been walking through the streets of London at night
when stopped by a watchman.The plaintiff was taken
by the watchman to a watch-house where the defendant, a parish officer, asked himhis name and the reason for carrying his bnndle at night. Not satisfied
with the replies, the defendant committed plaintiff to
prison for the night. The court .fonucl for the defend-

defendant Canbre, J., concurring, foundthat the suspicion
for detaining plaintiff was not groundless, and that
"it is highly necessary that they [ watchn1en] should
have such a power of detention * * *. We should be
very soTry if the law were otherwise." 3 Taunt at 15.
There is no reason to believe thnt similar authority
was not commonly exercisedby pC'ace-keep:ing officers
in the colonies.
With growing industrializationand urbanization in
the 19th and 20th centuries, the idea of the mode111
police force took hold-a force expected not only to
solve crimes, bnt also to maintain order and to deter
s It was uot until 1829 that the first police force was fonued
in London. 3 Radzinowicz A History of English Criminal Law
109-112 (1948).
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their commission. Younger, Stop and Frisk: Say it
Likeit is, 58 J. Cir.L., C. & P.S. 293, 299 (1967); Note,
The Law of Arrest: Constitutionality of Detention,
and Frisk Acts, 59 N.,V. U . L. Rev. 641, 652 (1965).
The power to conduct on-the-spot inquiry is central
to the performance
of the protective role. As the New
York Court of Appeals said in People v. Rivera, 14
N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.E. 2d. :32, 34; 252 N.Y.S. 2d 458,
461: "Prompt inquiry into suspicions or unusual
street action is an indispensih1e police power in the
orderly gove1·mnent of large urban communities."
Mr. Justice Burton, who in his early career served
for five years as the mayor of one of our largest
cities, stated in similar vein (concurring in Brinegar
v. Unites States, 338 U.S. 160, 179-180):
Government agents have duties of crime preprevention and crime detection as well as the duty
of arresting offenders caught in the commission
of a crime or later identified us having committed a crime. The performance of the first
duties are as important as the performance of
the last. * * *
The indispensability of some authority to detain
for purposes of limited inquiry has heen universally
acknowledged by our courts including the federal
courts, e.g., Trusty v. Oklahoma, 360 F. 2d 173,
(C..A. 10); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412 (C.A.
D); Busby v. United States 296 F. 2d 328 (C.A. 9),
certiorari denied, 369 U.S. 876; United States v. Vita,
294 F. 2d 524 ( C..A. 2), certiorari denied, 369 U.S.
823: Trilling v. United States, 260 F. 2d 677 (C.A.
D.C.); Lee v. UnitedStates, 221 F. 2d 29 (C.A.D.C.).
445

Moreover, it seems appropriate to add that the citizen called upon to respond to such limited inquiry does
not suffer the obloquy which may be associated with
an arrest. Rather, he is performing· the ordinary civic
duty, familiar in all organized societies, to provide information in aid of law enforcement. See Miranda, v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478.
Henry v. United States, 361U.S. 98, is not to the contrary. In that case, the prosecution conceded in the
lower courts that an arrest took place when federal
agents stopped the car which they were pursuing.
That concession was accepted hy this Court as the
basis of its decision. However, as the Court observed,
the government had made clear that it intended to
argue in a subsequent case (Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253) that arrests do not necessarily occur
each time an individual is detained. 361 U.S. at 103,
note 7. In Rios, this Court implicitly ruled that Henry
was not a sweeping decision, eliminating all power
on the part of police officers to detain suspects. For
if Henry had disposed of this issue, there would have
been no need in Rios to remand for a determination
of the precise time that the arrest occurred. See 364
U.S. at 262. In short, detention, as such, is not unreasonable. When the proper circumstances are shown,
it may be reasonable and within the ambit of the
Fourth Amendment.
C. 'l'HE TEST OF THE POWER TO DETAIN MUST BE REASONABLENESS
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

To say that the Fourth An1endment does not, per se,
condemn a brief detention for investigation is not to
argue that the police should be at large or to denigrate
446
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the role of the Amendment. It is to say only that the
Fourth Amendment is not an absolute and that its
prohibition is aimed at unreasonable searches and seizseizures.The power of limited detention whichwe support
is one which 1nust be carefully circumscribed, and it
is the flu1ction of the courts, in keeping with their
tradition, to confine it within proper bounds-to chart
the course between the recognized danger of police
abuse on the one hand and the not insignificant danger
of police paralysis on the other.
Many atten1pts have been 111ade to for1nulatc a
standard governing a limited forn1 of detention. Terms
such as "reasonable cause to investigate": "reasonable grounds to suspect" "reasonable grounds for
inquiry", "reasonable suspicion" "founded suspjsuspicion" 8 and "circumstances suggestive of the possibility
of violation of criminal law" have been proposed or
6
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Yow1ger, Stop and Frisk: Say it Like it is, 58 J. Cr. L., C.

& P.S. 293 (1967); Brinegar v. United States 338 U.S. 160,

179. See also United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 533 (C.A.
2), certiorari denied, 369 U.S. 823; Trilling v. United States,
260 F. 2d 677, 701.
5
Warner, The Uniform ArrestAct, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 321
(1942); Note, The Law of Arrest: Constitutionalityof DetenDetention and Frisk Acts 59 N.W. U. L. Rev. 641, G56 (1965); commonwealth
v. Lehan, 347 Mass.194, 197 N.E. 2d 840, 845; United
States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 784 (S.D.N.Y.).
6
Brief for the United States p. 11, Rios v. United States,
No. 52, O.T., 1960.
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180(a) McKinney Supp. 1964);
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest,
54: J. Cr. L., C. & P .S. 393, 413 (1963); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 2d 873, 876; Wendleboe v.
Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178, 181.
8
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412, 415 (C.A. 9).
9
State v. Hope, 85 N.J. Super. 551, 205 A. 2d 457. See also,
State v. Chronister, 353 P. 2d 493 (Okla..).
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applied. Recognizing the problems encountered in
articulating a concept that lies somewhere between
probable cause and bare suspicion, the AmericanLaw
!nstitnte's Draft for a l\lodel Code of Pre-Arraignment
1
procedure Section 2.02(2) (1965) has avoided
the adoption of a specific tern1 and has proposed a
guideline: detention by a law enforcement officer is
proper \vhen "a person is observed in circm11stances
which suggest that he has committed or is about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor and such action is
reasonablynecessary to enable the officer to determine
the lawfulness of that person's conduct * *
The
key word in the definition is "circumstances". The
lawfulness of a detention should be considered in the
light of .the particular circumstances as they confront
the responsihle persons immediately on the scene. One
judge has conuuentcd that " [ s Jsweeping generalities
ought not to be indulgedin, and the focus should be
on the facts of the particular case." United States v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 83 (S.D.N.Y.), reversed
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalinoalino,
285 F. 2cl 408 (C..A. 2). Courts and commentators have
suggested a number of factors which should be considered in deter1nining whether a detention is proper.
They include the foil owing:
1. 'l'he time of day. 10
Busby v. United States, 296 F. 2c.l 328 (C.A. 9), certiorari
denied, 369 U.S. 876; Bell v. United States 280 F. 2d 717
(C.A.D.C.); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197,196 N.E. 2d
840; State v. Harris,265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W. 2d 327; 1Vendleboe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178; Tiffany, McIntyre and Rotenberg, Detection of Crime 19 (1967) ; Nicholson
v. United States, 355 F. 2d 80 ( C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 384
U.S. 974.
10
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2. The p lace where the suspect is observed.11
3. The incidence of crime in the immediate
neighborhood.12
4. The law enforcement officer's prior knowledge of the suspect.13
5. The appearance of the suspect; i.e.,
whether he resembles someone whom the police
are seeking.14
6. The pre-detention conduct of the suspect
and his companions.13
7. The experience of the law enforcement
officer.10
8. The seriousness of the suspected offense.11
9. The necessity for immediate investigative
activity.18
See, generally, Tiffany, McIntyre and Rotenberg, Detection
of Crimech. 2 (1967) ; .Arnold v. United Sta.tes,
382 F. 2<l 4, 7 ( C.A. 9).
Statev. Freeland. 255 Iowa 1334125 N.W.2d 825.
Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372 (C.A.D.C.) , certiorari
denied 359 U.S. 998: Commonwealth v. Lehan, supra, note 10;
State v. Chronister 35:3 P. 2d 493 (Okla); Trustyv. Oklahoma,
360 F. 2d in (C.A. 10).
13 Commonwealth \'. Lehan. (ibid.), State . v. Chronister,
( ibid.): Brinegar v. United Sttes, 338 U.S. 160, 170.
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923 (C.A. 9), certiorari
denied, 388 F.S. 922: Ellis v. United States, supra, note 12;
Goldsmith v. United States, 277F. 2d 335 (C.A..D.C.), certiorari
denied, sub nom. Carterv UnitedStates, 364 U.S. 863; Rodgers
v. UnitedStates,362 F. :2d 358 ( C.A. 8).
1
Wilson v Porter 3Gl F. 2d 412, 414 (C.A. 9); United
States, v. Katz 238 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Thomas 250 F. Supp. 771, 775 (S.D.N.Y.); State v. Terry, 5
Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114.
16
State v. Terry, (ibid.); United States v. Thomas, 250 F.
Supp. 771, 785 (S.D.N.Y.).
17
Lee v. United States, 221 F. 2d 29, 30 (C.A.D.C.); United
States, v. Bonannosupra, page 11.
18
United States v. Bonanno, (ibid. ).
11

12

j
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The sum total of all the suggestions brings one back
to the terms of the Fourth Amendment itself-a proseizures.
protection against "unreasonable" searches
What is r.easonable or "unreasonable'' must necessarily
vary with differing times and differing situations.
Similarly, it is impossible to define with exactitude
the permissible extent of a detention not amounting to
an arrest. Once more, we submit, the constitutional
standard must be one of reasonableness under the
circumstances. When the suspected offense is not
serious and a modicum of essential information (e.g.,
the suspect's identity and address) has been obtained, so that the police would suffer little more than
inconvenience if the citizen were permitted to go his
way, it is reasonable to restrict the allowable period
of the detention to very narrow limits. Conversely,
where the person is unknown to the police, the offense
under investigation is serious and the suspect's explanation is equivocal, a detention for a somewhat
longer (though not protracted) period would seem
proper, at least where the questioning is on the scene.
The duty imposed upon policemen by society to investigate and deter crime requires that they be allowed
to question individuals whom they have reasonably
stopped. Trilling v. United States, 260 F. 2d 677, 701
(C.A.D.C.). This Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384

and

19•

A discussion of the time limits stated in various statutes
lasting from twenty minutes (Draft for a. Model Code of PreArra.ignment Procedure) to four hours (New Hampshire Laws
Sec. 595 :2) would, for our purposes, be of no import. We agree
with the First Circuit that a State's statutory time provision
does not, ipso facto, crea.te a. constitutional standa.rd. Hancock v.
Nelson, 363 F. 2d 249 (C.A.. 1).
19
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U.S. 436, enunciated certain procedural safeguards to

be employed"when an individual is taken into custody
orotherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities
ities * * * and is subjected to questioning." 384 U.S.
.at 478. At the same time, the right of policemen to
conduct "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning of
citizens'' was noted, this Court stating that responsible
·citizenship required citizens to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. 384
U.S. at 477-478. It apepars, therefore, that the Court,
in Miranda, did not consider an on-the-street detention
based upon reasonable suspicion to constitute "custodial
dial interrogation", thereby requiring the officer to inform the suspect of his rights to silence and counsel
384 U.S. at 477. See Brown v. United States, 365 F. 2d
976, 979 (C.A.D.C.); United States v. Davis, 259 F.
Supp. 496 (D. Mass.). Perhaps, an admonition should
be required when the questioning beco1nes sustained
and moves from what might be termed preliminary
investigation to a focus on the individual as a criminal.
We believe, however, that in the usual type of street
investigation Miranda does not apply. We assume that
a refusal to respond to a policeman's questions is a
neutral act and will not establish probable cause to
arrest where it would otherwise be lacking, United
States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 531 (C.A. 2), certiorari
denied, 369 U.S. 823; see United States v. Bonanno,
supra, 180 F. Supp. at 76; cf. Perkins, The
Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201, 259 (1940).
"This does not, however, seem to us to require a
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Miranda-type warning every time a policeman. asks·a

question.20

..

II. A. POLICE OFFICER can LAWFULLY "FRISK"

A. SUSPECT

THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH THAT HE REASONABLY
SONABLY APPREHENDS DANGER FROM A HIDDEN. WEAPON

In keeping with our view that the question .a t issue
here is reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,
we think it unimportant whether a frisk. is denominated
nated a search; rather, the question is whether, even
assUlning that it is a search, it is reasonable_. In our
view, when a person is lawfully detained forquestioning
tioning (albeit on less than probable cause), a police
<>fficer is warranted in patting down the outer clothing
of the suspect if the circumstances are such that he
reasonably apprehends that the person detained may
..

have a dangerous weapon at hand..

In those limited circumstances, we think a frisk
can he deemed a reasonable search under the Fourth
..Amendment. The invasion of privacy or interference
with liberty is slight.21 Moreover, the detention which
occasioned the frisk must be based on the founded
Wl1ether other acts on the part of the detained suspectsuch as seeking to avoid
the detention, giving obviously false
answers, or displaying objects of potential use for criminal purposes-would justify a formal arrest must necessarily be determinecl in t.he context of a particularsituation. The sum total of
the circumstances arising after the detention has occurred, when
combined with the factors existing at the time of the detention,
may create probable ca.use for such an arrest. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160; Riosv. United States, 364 U.S. 253.
21 Compare the statement in Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 536-537, that "there can be no ready tes for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails."
20
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suspicion that the individual might be, or has been,.
involved in a serious act. The justification of the
frisk itself is to protect theofficer acting in pursuit
of his lawful duties. In our day, when the size of a
weapon has no relationship to the harm it can inflict,
the need of the police for such protectionis substantial, as numerous judges and commentators have recognized. State v. Moore, 187 A. 2d 807 (Del.); Commonwealth
v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 2d 873;
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 393, 419 (1963) ;
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 324
(1942); Younger, Stop and Frisk: Say it Like it Is?
58 J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 293 (1967).
Opponents of stop-and-frisk authority stress the
possibilities of abuse. We do not minimize that danger,
although we note that this is inevitably true of almost
all police procedures, and, perhaps, as Lord Acton
suggested, of almost all exercises of authority hy the
State. The reconciliation of the need for the power
and the danger of its abuse must be found in the
development of rules and practices which fix sensible
limits and in the diligent supervision of the courts.
We urge no right to search a person for contraband
when he is detained on less than probable cause. However, when the type of frisk which we regard as lawful-a patting down for weapons--does reveal the existence
istence of weapons, we see no sound reason why the
weapon so discovered may not be introduced in evidence
dence or provide the basis of a prosecution. At the
moment the peace officer uncovers, pursuant to a frisk,

Warner
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item which the suspect unlawfully possesses, a
crime is being committed in the officer's presence. It
would be irrational to prohibit prosecution of that
offense, merely because in the first instance the suspect
was detained-lawfully-on less than probable cause.
Police have the responsibility to detect crime. If the
means of detection are not unconstitutional, there is
no reason to construct an exclusionary rule to benefit
the suspect who has been discovered committing a
criminal offense in the presence of a.police officer. The
interests of society are not adequately served merely
by removing the dangerous weapon from the suspect's
person and sending him on his way.
In cases where searches and seizures have been held
violative of the Constitution, the subject matter discovered by the illegal procedure has been excluded
from evidence in order to deter the police from resorting
ing to illegal methods. W Weeksv. United States, 232 U.S.
3.83; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. A similar exclusionexclusionaryrule would manifestly be inappropriate for items
uncovered ·by lawful frisks. On the contrary, the customary rules of evidence should govern, and such evidence, if otherwise admissible, should be received.
Nor is there any reason to restrict the admissibility
of evidence obtained from frisks to weapons so long
as the frisk had a legitimate purpose and was not a
lnere excuse to search the person on less than probable
cause. Once more, meaningful reference can be made
to situations involving evidence seized in a lawful
search based upon probable cause or incident to an
arrest. If a frisk has been properly conducted and
f found to be legally justifiable, the mere fact that the

an
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expectations of an officer seeking a dangerous weapon
were not realized, and that a suspect's covered pocket
concealed some other unlawfully possessed object,
should not prevent the officer from removing what he
has found. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155;
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238.
In sum, we believe that it is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment to recognize a power in law enforcement
forcement officers to detain and question under circumstances
cumstances amounting to less than probabe cause for a
formal arrest, and that, in exercising such power, the
officer may legitimately protect himself by a frisk for
dangerous weapons.
Respectfully submitted.
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